FR-135 CRA 合規框架 · 已灌入框架、待顧問確認 · 2026-10-12

CRA 34 條控制項標題與建議證據(英文版)

每條控制項的英文標題與該收什麼證據,灌進框架當控制項標題與建議證據(guidance)

法條只寫產品要做到什麼,沒寫怎麼證明。這份為 34 條各擬一個英文標題,並寫出建議證據:交什麼檔、檔裡要看到什麼、證據從哪來。沒拆評估目標(AO)的 18 條,建議證據掛在控制項;拆了 AO 的 16 條,建議證據掛在各 AO 底下(見 cra-assessment-objectives.md)。

§1

使用前須知

  • 狀態:已灌入框架,待顧問日後確認。 建議證據是 AI 依法條與 ENISA 子要求推出來的詮釋,不是官方內容;決策者裁定不擋出貨,顧問確認有誤時以框架新版本或補灌修正。
  • 依據:法條原文(Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 Annex I、II 與 Article 13、14,見 docs/reference/CRA/)與 ENISA/JRC 對照報告(JRC137340,2024)的子要求;逐條對照見同資料夾 enisa-mapping-worksheet.md。不是官方清單,也不是調和標準;ENISA 與 EN 40000 的文字不抄進框架。
  • 為什麼全英文:框架層沒有多語機制,一本框架只能存一種語言;CRA 的讀者是歐洲客戶與公告機構,比照 CMMC 全英文。法條原文(statement)不動。
  • 三段式:每點寫 Deliverable(交什麼檔或紀錄)、Must show(審閱者要在裡面看到什麼)、Evidence(upload 客戶自有檔上傳/system — <頁面> 系統其他頁填完就有、不該再上傳/template — <範本> 系統範本產出)。標 (Phase N) 的系統落點是之後才上線的功能,在那之前先上傳。
  • 改內容改 scripts/cra_ao_content.py,再跑 python scripts/gen_cra_ao_restructure.py:本檔「建議證據」段(標記之間)、cra-assessment-objectives.md 與 jedi-oscal-v2 seed 005 一起重產。標題表不在產生範圍,改標題要同步改 002 seed。
  • EN 40000-1-4 出版後要替換。 CRA 調和標準預估 2027 年出版,屆時以框架新版本替換,舊專案沿用舊版。
  • 對 Default 類自評客戶夠用;Class I/II 要找公告機構的客戶只能當準備用。
  • 控制項代號以 seed 為準:CRA.I.*/CRA.II.*/CRA.A2.*/CRA.ART.*(Annex II 用 A2,因為 CRA 的 Annex III 是重要產品清單,用 III 會誤讀)。
§2

Control titles

Titles are self-drafted (the regulation has no item headings), following the CMMC title style: noun phrase, title case, at most 8 words. The basis column quotes the phrase each title is taken from.

Control Title Basis (legal text)
CRA.I.1 Risk-Based Cybersecurity by Design Part I (1): "designed, developed and produced … an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks"
CRA.I.2.a No Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities Part I (2)(a): "without known exploitable vulnerabilities"
CRA.I.2.b Secure-by-Default Configuration & Reset Part I (2)(b): "a secure by default configuration … including the possibility to reset the product to its original state"
CRA.I.2.c Security Updates & Automatic Updating Part I (2)(c): "addressed through security updates, including … automatic security updates"
CRA.I.2.d Protection from Unauthorised Access Part I (2)(d): "protection from unauthorised access by appropriate control mechanisms"
CRA.I.2.e Data Confidentiality Part I (2)(e): "protect the confidentiality of stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data"
CRA.I.2.f Integrity of Data, Programs & Configuration Part I (2)(f): "protect the integrity of … data … commands, programs and configuration"
CRA.I.2.g Data Minimisation Part I (2)(g): "limited to what is necessary … (data minimisation)"
CRA.I.2.h Availability of Essential & Basic Functions Part I (2)(h): "protect the availability of essential and basic functions, also after an incident"
CRA.I.2.i Limiting Impact on Other Devices & Networks Part I (2)(i): "minimise the negative impact … on the availability of services provided by other devices or networks"
CRA.I.2.j Attack Surface Limitation Part I (2)(j): "limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces"
CRA.I.2.k Exploitation Mitigation & Incident Impact Reduction Part I (2)(k): "reduce the impact of an incident using appropriate exploitation mitigation mechanisms"
CRA.I.2.l Recording & Monitoring of Internal Activity Part I (2)(l): "recording and monitoring relevant internal activity"
CRA.I.2.m Secure Data Removal & Transfer Part I (2)(m): "securely and easily remove on a permanent basis all data and settings … transferred … in a secure manner"
CRA.II.1 Vulnerability & Component Identification (SBOM) Part II (1): "identify and document vulnerabilities and components … software bill of materials"
CRA.II.2 Timely Vulnerability Remediation Part II (2): "address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay"
CRA.II.3 Regular Security Testing & Review Part II (3): "effective and regular tests and reviews of the security"
CRA.II.4 Public Disclosure of Fixed Vulnerabilities Part II (4): "share and publicly disclose information about fixed vulnerabilities"
CRA.II.5 Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Part II (5): "a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure"
CRA.II.6 Vulnerability Information Sharing & Reporting Contact Part II (6): "facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities … providing a contact address"
CRA.II.7 Secure Update Distribution Part II (7): "mechanisms to securely distribute updates"
CRA.II.8 Timely, Free Security Updates with Advisories Part II (8): "disseminated without delay and … free of charge, accompanied by advisory messages"
CRA.A2.1 Manufacturer Identity & Contact Details Annex II (1): "the name … of the manufacturer, and the postal address, the email address or other digital contact"
CRA.A2.2 Vulnerability Reporting Contact & CVD Policy Annex II (2): "the single point of contact … and where the manufacturer's policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure can be found"
CRA.A2.3 Product Identification Annex II (3): "name and type and any additional information enabling the unique identification"
CRA.A2.4 Intended Purpose & Security Properties Annex II (4): "the intended purpose … essential functionalities and information about the security properties"
CRA.A2.5 Foreseeable Significant Cybersecurity Risks Annex II (5): "known or foreseeable circumstance … which may lead to significant cybersecurity risks"
CRA.A2.6 EU Declaration of Conformity Address Annex II (6): "the internet address at which the EU declaration of conformity can be accessed"
CRA.A2.7 Security Support Type & End Date Annex II (7): "the type of technical security support … and the end-date of the support period"
CRA.A2.8 Detailed Secure-Use Instructions Annex II (8): "detailed instructions … and information on" items (a)–(f)
CRA.A2.9 SBOM Access Information Annex II (9): "information on where the software bill of materials can be accessed"
CRA.ART.13.RA Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Art. 13(2)(3): "an assessment of the cybersecurity risks"
CRA.ART.13.SP Support Period Art. 13(8): "the support period shall be at least five years"
CRA.ART.14.RP Reporting of Exploited Vulnerabilities and Severe Incidents Art. 14(1)(3): "notify any actively exploited vulnerability … any severe incident"
§3

Annex I Part I(14)

CRA.I.1 Risk-Based Cybersecurity by Design

See assessment objectives [a]–[b]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.a No Known Exploitable Vulnerabilities

  • Deliverable: Pre-release vulnerability scan reports for the released version (source code, third-party dependencies, container images).
    Must show: product version scanned; scan date; tool name and version; every finding with its severity and status.
    Evidence: system — Source Scan results (FR-134); until linked as evidence: upload the exported file
  • Deliverable: Release gate record.
    Must show: the decision to release; the list of vulnerabilities still open at release, each with the reason it is not exploitable or how it is mitigated; who approved and when.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Penetration test or independent security assessment report, where one was performed.
    Must show: scope and version tested; test dates; findings and their remediation status.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.I.2.b Secure-by-Default Configuration & Reset

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.c Security Updates & Automatic Updating

See assessment objectives [a]–[e]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.d Protection from Unauthorised Access

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.e Data Confidentiality

  • Deliverable: Cryptography inventory for data at rest and in transit.
    Must show: each algorithm and key length; where it is used; the deprecation list it was checked against (name and version, e.g. ECCG agreed cryptographic mechanisms or NIST SP 800-131A).
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Encryption and key management design.
    Must show: which stored data is encrypted and how; how keys are generated, stored and rotated; TLS versions and cipher suites enabled by default; certificate issuance and validation.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Encryption test result, such as a TLS configuration scan.
    Must show: target, date and tool; no weak protocol or cipher accepted.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.I.2.f Integrity of Data, Programs & Configuration

See assessment objectives [a]–[b]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.g Data Minimisation

  • Deliverable: Data inventory.
    Must show: each data item the product collects or processes; its purpose; why it is necessary for the intended purpose; where it is sent.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Retention and deletion rules.
    Must show: how long each data item is kept and how it is deleted when no longer needed.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.I.2.h Availability of Essential & Basic Functions

See assessment objectives [a]–[b]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.i Limiting Impact on Other Devices & Networks

  • Deliverable: Outbound connection inventory.
    Must show: each destination, purpose and frequency; that the product connects only where needed.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Retry, timeout and back-off settings.
    Must show: the values that stop the product from flooding busy or unresponsive services, and any bandwidth or request-rate cap.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.I.2.j Attack Surface Limitation

  • Deliverable: External interface inventory.
    Must show: every network port, API, administrative interface and physical port; why each is needed; the endpoints callable without authentication and why.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Port scan result of a default installation.
    Must show: only the ports in the inventory are open; scan date and product version.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Where the product includes hardware: tamper-resistance measures required by the risk assessment (not applicable to software-only products).
    Must show: the measure and the risk it addresses.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.I.2.k Exploitation Mitigation & Incident Impact Reduction

  • Deliverable: Architecture diagram with isolation boundaries.
    Must show: network segments, containers, sandboxes and privilege separation; what an attacker who compromises one part still cannot reach.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: List of exploitation mitigation techniques applied.
    Must show: e.g. running without root privileges, dropped capabilities, memory protections, sandboxing; where each is applied.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.I.2.l Recording & Monitoring of Internal Activity

See assessment objectives [a]–[d]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.I.2.m Secure Data Removal & Transfer

See assessment objectives [a]–[b]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

§4

Annex I Part II(8)

CRA.II.1 Vulnerability & Component Identification (SBOM)

See assessment objectives [a]–[b]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.II.2 Timely Vulnerability Remediation

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.II.3 Regular Security Testing & Review

  • Deliverable: Security test plan.
    Must show: test types, frequency and scope; high-risk components covered first.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Recent security test reports.
    Must show: execution dates that follow the planned frequency; product version tested; findings.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Automated security test configuration and run records, where tests run on each build or release.
    Must show: the pipeline step that runs the tests and recent run results.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.II.4 Public Disclosure of Fixed Vulnerabilities

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.II.5 Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Policy

  • Deliverable: Coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy.
    Must show: intake channels; response time commitments; how reporters are kept informed; disclosure timeline. Its public URL is taken from the assessed target.
    Evidence: template — CVD Policy; URL: system — Assessed target, public links
  • Deliverable: Records showing the policy is enforced.
    Must show: for each report received: receipt, response, fix and disclosure dates. If no external report has been received yet, a record of an internal exercise that ran a simulated report through the process.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.II.6 Vulnerability Information Sharing & Reporting Contact

  • Deliverable: Vulnerability reporting contact address.
    Must show: the published email address, web form or PSIRT contact, and where it is published.
    Evidence: system — SSP parties, vulnerability-contact role
  • Deliverable: Records of measures taken to share vulnerability information.
    Must show: how reports are passed on, including notifications to maintainers of third-party and open-source components about vulnerabilities found in their components (Art. 13(6)) and any fix shared with them.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.II.7 Secure Update Distribution

  • Deliverable: Update signing and verification design.
    Must show: the code-signing certificate used; how the product verifies the signature and publisher before installing.
    Evidence: upload
  • Deliverable: Distribution channel description.
    Must show: official download sites or registries; who can publish to them; published hashes and how users verify them. Automatic installation on the product side is covered by CRA.I.2.c.
    Evidence: upload

CRA.II.8 Timely, Free Security Updates with Advisories

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

§5

Annex II(9)

CRA.A2.1 Manufacturer Identity & Contact Details

  • Deliverable: Manufacturer identity and contact details.
    Must show: name or registered trade name or trademark; postal address; email or other digital contact; website where available.
    Evidence: system — SSP parties, manufacturer role
  • Deliverable: The page of the user information (Annex II) showing these details.
    Must show: the same details as recorded in the system, in a language users and market surveillance authorities understand.
    Evidence: template — Information and Instructions to the User

CRA.A2.2 Vulnerability Reporting Contact & CVD Policy

  • Deliverable: Single point of contact and CVD policy location.
    Must show: the contact for reporting and receiving vulnerability information; the URL of the CVD policy.
    Evidence: system — SSP parties, vulnerability-contact role; policy URL: system — Assessed target, public links
  • Deliverable: The page of the user information (Annex II) showing them.
    Must show: the contact and policy URL; at least one means of contact that is not an automated tool (Art. 13(17)).
    Evidence: template — Information and Instructions to the User

CRA.A2.3 Product Identification

  • Deliverable: Product identification.
    Must show: product name, type and any additional identifier (model, version, batch or serial number).
    Evidence: system — Assessed target, CRA fields
  • Deliverable: Proof the identification is provided with the product.
    Must show: the user information page, label or about screen showing the same identification.
    Evidence: template — Information and Instructions to the User

CRA.A2.4 Intended Purpose & Security Properties

  • Deliverable: Intended purpose and operating environment.
    Must show: intended purpose; security environment provided by the manufacturer.
    Evidence: system — Assessed target, CRA fields
  • Deliverable: The section of the user information (Annex II) on intended purpose and security properties.
    Must show: intended purpose; security environment; essential functionalities; security properties.
    Evidence: template — Information and Instructions to the User

CRA.A2.5 Foreseeable Significant Cybersecurity Risks

  • Deliverable: Known or foreseeable circumstances leading to significant cybersecurity risks.
    Must show: circumstances under intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse, taken from the risk assessment.
    Evidence: system — Risk Assessment tab (Phase 2); foreseeable misuse: system — Assessed target, CRA fields
  • Deliverable: The section of the user information (Annex II) listing them.
    Must show: the same circumstances, written for users.
    Evidence: template — Information and Instructions to the User

CRA.A2.6 EU Declaration of Conformity Address

  • Deliverable: EU declaration of conformity address, where applicable.
    Must show: the internet address at which the declaration can be accessed, or that a copy is provided with the product.
    Evidence: system — Assessed target, public links (EU declaration of conformity)

CRA.A2.7 Security Support Type & End Date

  • Deliverable: Type of technical security support and support period end date.
    Must show: the type of support offered; the end date of the support period.
    Evidence: system — Assessed target, CRA fields
  • Deliverable: The section of the user information (Annex II) stating them.
    Must show: the same support type and end date as recorded in the system.
    Evidence: template — Support Period Statement

CRA.A2.8 Detailed Secure-Use Instructions

See assessment objectives [a]–[f]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.A2.9 SBOM Access Information

  • Deliverable: Where the SBOM can be accessed, if the manufacturer makes it available to users.
    Must show: the location or request method; or a record of the decision not to make it available (this item is optional).
    Evidence: system — Assessed target, CRA fields
§6

Articles 13 and 14(3)

CRA.ART.13.RA Cybersecurity Risk Assessment

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.ART.13.SP Support Period

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

CRA.ART.14.RP Reporting of Exploited Vulnerabilities and Severe Incidents

See assessment objectives [a]–[c]. 各 AO 的建議證據見 cra-assessment-objectives.md。

§7

審稿留意(內部)

只給審稿人用,不灌進框架。

  • 法條沒明寫、依 ENISA 保留的:CRA.I.2.b [b] 初始帳密(法條只寫 secure by default)、CRA.I.2.l [b] 紀錄防竄改(ENISA 3.1.12)。
  • 依實務加的:CRA.II.2 [a] 依嚴重度訂修補期限(法條只寫「依風險、不延遲」,[b] 要靠它才判得了)。
  • 由 Article 13 帶進來的:CRA.II.1 [b] 第三方元件選用紀錄(Art. 13(5))、CRA.II.6 通知元件維護者(Art. 13(6))、CRA.A2.2 至少一種非自動化聯絡方式(Art. 13(17))。
  • 整條都在 ENISA 之外的:CRA.I.2.m、Annex II 九條、Articles 13 and 14 三條,證據全依法條自擬。